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ABSTRACT: Scholars of race in antiquity commonly claim that Aristotle holds proto-racist views 
about βάρβαροι or non-Greeks. But a careful examination of Aristotle’s remarks in his Politics 
about slavery, non-Greek political institutions, and Greek and non-Greek natural qualities calls 
into question such claims. No doubt, Aristotle held views at odds with modern liberalism, such as 
defenses of gender subordination and the exploitation of slave and non-slave labor. But claims that 
Aristotle holds proto-racist views are regularly but erroneously asserted without careful 
consideration of relevant textual evidence. My article argues that Aristotle neither categorically 
distinguishes Greeks and non-Greeks nor does he endorse the claim that Greeks are categorically 
superior to non-Greeks. Indeed, Aristotle regularly draws upon non-Greek political institutions in 
his own formulation of the best constitution and he praises the non-Greek constitution of Carthage 
as superior to that of Greek constitutions such as Sparta and Crete. 
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1 I am grateful to audiences at the Université de Montréal, the Institut d’études scientifiques de Cargèse, and the 
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy for feedback on earlier versions of this article, especially from Laetitia 
Monteils-Laeng, Mor Segev, Pierre Pellegrin, David Lefebvre, Monte Johnson, Catherine Dalimier, Erica Holberg, 
John Thorpe, Andrew Payne, and J.J. Mulhern. I am especially grateful for the constructive criticism of three 
anonymous referees from the Review of Politics and its editor, Dr. Abbey.  
In the last few decades, scholars have laudably re-examined the beliefs of canonical figures in the 
history of political thought concerning the subject of race. Figures such as Plato, Immanuel Kant, 
and John Stuart Mill have been re-evaluated, both positively and negatively, in light of their views 
about race and racism.2 Less laudable, though, is the often repeated claim that Aristotle viewed all 
βάρβαροι or non-Greeks as inherently inferior to Greeks and thus were “slaves by nature” on 
racial grounds.3 Two recent studies of race in antiquity take such a view as needing no further 
argument: for instance,  Denise Eileen McCoskey asserts that Aristotle “proposed that barbarians, 
as opposed to Greeks, were inherently servile” and Erik Jensen claims that Aristotle “defined all 
barbarians as natural slaves fit to be ruled over by Greeks.”4 Such comments imply that Aristotle 
believes both that Greeks and non-Greeks are categorically distinct and that Greeks are 
categorically superior to non-Greeks. Characterizing those claims in terms of race is complicated: 
although modern notions of race are based on purported laws of hereditary descent and biologically 
 
2 See, for instance, Rebecca LeMoine, Plato’s Caves: The Liberating Sting of Cultural Diversity (Oxford University 
Press, 2020); Thomas Hill and Bernard Boxill, “Kant and Race,” in Race and Racism, ed. B. Boxill (Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 448-471; and Mark Tunick, “Tolerant Imperialism: John Stuart Mill’s Defense of British Rule in India,” 
Review of Politics 68, no. 4 (2006): 586-611.  
3 Such a view already finds its proponents in antiquity: Plutarch, in his On the Fortune of Alexander (I.6), reports that 
Aristotle counseled his student Alexander to rule Greeks in the fashion of a ruler (ἡγεμονικῶς), but non-Greeks in 
the fashion of a master (δεσποτικῶς). The Greek term βάρβαρος (and the cognate term βαρβαρικός) is contested 
both in Aristotle’s time and in our own; I will translate the term throughout my article as “non-Greek.” See further 
Edith Hall, Inventing the Barbarian. Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); 
Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Erich 
S. Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); and most recently Thomas 
Harrison, “Reinventing the Barbarian,” Classical Philology 115, no. 2 (2020): 139-63.  
4 Denise Eileen McCoskey, Race. Antiquity and its Legacy (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 24; Erik Jensen, Barbarians 
in the Greek and Roman World (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2018), 69. Non-Aristotle specialists echo the view. For 
instance, Jonathan Wolff, in his recent Introduction to Moral Philosophy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018), claims 
that Aristotle believes that “non-Greeks have lower powers of deliberative rationality than Greeks, and they are more 
likely to be ruled by their bodily appetites. Non-Greeks are therefore not suited to the same level of freedom and 
should become slaves of Greeks” (228). Other scholars who claim that Aristotle categorically distinguishes Greeks 
and non-Greeks include Vincent Rosivach, “Enslaving ‘Barbaroi’ and the Athenian Ideology of Slavery,” Historia 
48, no. 2 (1999): 129-157; Fulcran Teisserenc, “La question barbare: Platon ou Aristote?” Revue de philosophie 
ancienne 32, no. 1 (2014): 87-128; and Johannes Fritsche, “Aristotle’s Biological Justification of Slavery in Politics 
I,” Rhizomata 7, no. 1 (2019): 63-96.  
distinct groups, scholars in antiquity usually based group characteristics on climate or geography.5 
Nonetheless, many modern scholars follow Benjamin Isaac and claim that Aristotle’s views can 
be characterized as “proto-racist” on the grounds that “climate and geography rather than genetics 
are said to determine group characteristics.”6 My article will follow Isaac’s locution and examine 
whether Aristotle held “proto-racist” views, namely categorical claims about groups within 
humankind and their inherent inferiority or superiority. 
[Full paper forthcoming in Review of Politics.] 
 
 
5 McCoskey, Race, 23-34, surveys the difficulties of ascribing a non-biological concept of race to Greek and Roman 
authors. Although Fritsche, “Aristotle’s Biological Justification of Slavery” ascribes to Aristotle a biological notion 
of race (73-75), the scholarly consensus is that such a claim is mistaken. See, for instance, Isaac, Invention of Racism, 
70-73; Julia Ward, “Ethnos in the Politics: Aristotle and Race,” in Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, eds. Julia 
Ward and Tommy Lott (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2007), 20-23; and Mariska Leunissen, From Natural Character to 
Moral Virtue in Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5 n.6. 
6 Isaac, Invention of Racism, 74. Although one may distinguish racialism, the doctrine that there are biologically 
distinct groups, and racism, the doctrine that biologically distinct groups can be evaluated as inferior and superior, I 
will use the terms “proto-racist” and “proto-racism” to include both claims (see further Francisco Bethencourt, 
Racisms. From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014], 271-275).  
